Relax. The people in charge know what they're doing.
economist.com
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Dark matter
Back in the days of claret-filled city lunches, life was so simple. Company pension funds and mutual funds put money into the securities of states and listed firms and hoped that they did well. Things are a great deal more complicated now. Even as the private world has eclipsed public markets, finance has been convulsed by a computer-enhanced frenzy of creativity. In today's caffeine-fuelled dealing rooms, a barely regulated private-equity group could very well borrow money from syndicates of private lenders, including hedge funds, to spend on taking public companies private. At each stage, risks can be converted into securities, sliced up, repackaged, sold on and sliced up again. The endless opportunities to write contracts on underlying debt instruments explains why the outstanding value of credit-derivatives contracts has rocketed to $26 trillion—$9 trillion more than six months ago, and seven times as much as in 2003.
In many ways, these complex derivatives are good for economies. Because they allow investors to lay off the risk of borrowers' defaults, they free lenders to lend more. Because risk is dispersed to those who have an appetite for it, the system should be more robust. Because derivatives are traded in liquid markets, they rapidly transmit information about the creditworthiness of borrowers. The benefits of this hyperactive shuffling of money spread well beyond financial markets. If companies are borrowing more cheaply and sensibly to make acquisitions, pay dividends and buy back their own shares, businesses everywhere should run more efficiently.
That is the theory, at least. And so far, it has broadly been borne out. The markets struggled to cope with financial crises in Asia and Russia in the late 1990s and with the implosion of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, in 1998. By contrast, there were never serious fears that the dotcom bubble burst, September 11th 2001, or, more recently, the collapse of General Motors' bonds and investors' flight from risky investments, would lead the system to collapse.
Regulators understand very well how much the world stands to gain from this revolution in finance, but they are nevertheless nervous. Because of the lack of transparency, they cannot see whether these volatile new debt instruments are in safe hands or how they will behave in a crisis when everyone is heading for the exits. As Donald Rumsfeld might have put it, they have left a world of known unknowns for a twilight landscape of unknown unknowns.
Last week Timothy Geithner, the Federal Reserve's man on Wall Street, gave warning that all this might make financial crises less common, but more severe. Britain's Financial Services Authority complained this week that investment banks and hedge funds were sloppy and prone to conflicts of interest. In a panic, incomplete paperwork could cause the whole system to collapse amid disputes about who owns which liabilities. Worryingly, firms had wildly different estimates for the risks of similar portfolios of investments. Someone somewhere is investing on flawed assumptions.
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economist.com
...
Dark matter
Back in the days of claret-filled city lunches, life was so simple. Company pension funds and mutual funds put money into the securities of states and listed firms and hoped that they did well. Things are a great deal more complicated now. Even as the private world has eclipsed public markets, finance has been convulsed by a computer-enhanced frenzy of creativity. In today's caffeine-fuelled dealing rooms, a barely regulated private-equity group could very well borrow money from syndicates of private lenders, including hedge funds, to spend on taking public companies private. At each stage, risks can be converted into securities, sliced up, repackaged, sold on and sliced up again. The endless opportunities to write contracts on underlying debt instruments explains why the outstanding value of credit-derivatives contracts has rocketed to $26 trillion—$9 trillion more than six months ago, and seven times as much as in 2003.
In many ways, these complex derivatives are good for economies. Because they allow investors to lay off the risk of borrowers' defaults, they free lenders to lend more. Because risk is dispersed to those who have an appetite for it, the system should be more robust. Because derivatives are traded in liquid markets, they rapidly transmit information about the creditworthiness of borrowers. The benefits of this hyperactive shuffling of money spread well beyond financial markets. If companies are borrowing more cheaply and sensibly to make acquisitions, pay dividends and buy back their own shares, businesses everywhere should run more efficiently.
That is the theory, at least. And so far, it has broadly been borne out. The markets struggled to cope with financial crises in Asia and Russia in the late 1990s and with the implosion of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, in 1998. By contrast, there were never serious fears that the dotcom bubble burst, September 11th 2001, or, more recently, the collapse of General Motors' bonds and investors' flight from risky investments, would lead the system to collapse.
Regulators understand very well how much the world stands to gain from this revolution in finance, but they are nevertheless nervous. Because of the lack of transparency, they cannot see whether these volatile new debt instruments are in safe hands or how they will behave in a crisis when everyone is heading for the exits. As Donald Rumsfeld might have put it, they have left a world of known unknowns for a twilight landscape of unknown unknowns.
Last week Timothy Geithner, the Federal Reserve's man on Wall Street, gave warning that all this might make financial crises less common, but more severe. Britain's Financial Services Authority complained this week that investment banks and hedge funds were sloppy and prone to conflicts of interest. In a panic, incomplete paperwork could cause the whole system to collapse amid disputes about who owns which liabilities. Worryingly, firms had wildly different estimates for the risks of similar portfolios of investments. Someone somewhere is investing on flawed assumptions.
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